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Abstract 
By using a sample of 77 countries our analysis applies several nonparametric 
techniques in order to reveal the link between national culture and corruption. Based 
on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and the corruption perception index, the results 
reveal that countries with higher levels of corruption tend to have higher power 
distance and collectivism values in their society. 
 
 
Keywords: Nonparametric methods; Corruption perception index; National culture 
 
JEL classification: C14; C19; Z10 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 Corresponding author. Present address: Department of Economics, University of Thessaly, Korai 43, 
38333, Volos, Greece. Tel.: 0030 24210 74920. Fax:  0030 24210 74772.  
E-mail addresses: halkos@econ.uth.gr (GE Halkos), bus9nt@econ.uth.gr (NG Tzeremes).  
 
 2 
1. Introduction 
 The aim of this paper is to analyze and reveal the interrelation and the distinct 
characteristics between culture and corruption. Cultural values guide and shape the 
way the social institution functions (Licht et al, 2007). Barr and Serra (2010) suggest 
that social norms cannot be affected only by values and beliefs but by “the proportion 
of people who adhere to the norm, which in turn affects individuals’ beliefs in the 
values underlying the norm, and, as a consequence, the likelihood that the norm will 
be internalized by others including future generations”. This social mechanism 
explains the existence of “culture of corruption” indicating that individuals who grow 
up in societies in which corruption is prevalent will be more likely to accept 
corruption and act corruptly, in contrast with those who grow up in a more transparent 
society (Hauk and Saez-Marti, 2002). Our research argues the existence of distinct 
cultural characteristics which explain countries’ corruption levels and can be revealed 
through nonparametric techniques.      
2. Methodology and data 
Let the sample realizations ( , )i iY X be i.i.d. defined on . Then the 
nonparametric regression model has the form of: 
( ) , 1,..., .i i iY g X u i n            (1). 
Following Li and Racine (2007) ( ) ( )g x E Y x is a function of x . Then by 
denoting the joint probability density function (PDF) as , ( , )y xf x y the marginal PDF of 
X  as ( )f x and the conditional PDF of Y X  as , ( )y xf y x then: 
,( , ) ( , ) / ( )y xy xf x y f x y f x         (2). 
Li and Racine (2007, p.59-60) have proved that: 
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Equation (5) is the “local constant” kernel estimator or the “Nadaraya-
Watson” kernel estimator introduced by Nadaraya (1965) and Watson (1964) and K  is 
a second order Gaussian kernel and h is the appropriate bandwidth which will be 
analyzed next.  
For the calculation of bandwidth a data driven approach introduced by 
Hurvich et al. (1998) has been applied. The AICc criterion can be defined as
1: 
 
2 1 tr(H)/ln( )
1 tr( ) 2 /c
n
AIC
H n

 
 
 
        (6), 
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with ( )ig X

being a nonparametric estimator and H being n n weighting function 
with its ( , )thi j element given by  
                                               
1 Li and Racine (2004) have proved that AICc tends to perform better than the least square cross-
validation method for small samples (as in this case). 
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 According to Li and Racine (2007) there is a within sample measure goodness 
of fit analogue to the one of 
2
R parametric regression models. Let iY  denote the 
outcome and iY

the fitted values for observation i , then the 
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Then a consistent significance test for continuous regressors defined by Racine (1997) 
is applied in order to verify the significance of the explanatory variables on the 
depended. Let z denote the explanatory variable(s) that might be redundant, let 
X denote the remaining explanatory variable(s) in the regression model, and let 
Y denote the dependent variable. Then the null hypothesis can be written as (Racine 
2008, p. 67): 
   0 : ,H E y x z E Y z  almost everywhere, which is equivalent to 
 
0
,
: ( ) 0
E y x z
H x
x


 

 almost everywhere. In this way the test statistic is an 
estimator of   2( )I E x . 
 Our paper uses a sample of 77 countries2 with the variable of interest being the 
average value (of 1996-2006) of corruption perception index (CPI)3 provided by the 
                                               
2 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Rep, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Islamic Rep, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, 
Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian, Saudi Arabia, 
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, 
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Transparency International.  The explanatory variables used in order to measure 
countries’ national culture are derived from the four cultural dimensions as introduced 
by Hofstede (1980)4: power distance (PDI); individualism versus collectivism (IDV,); 
masculinity versus femininity (MAS); and uncertainty avoidance (UAI)5. 
3. Empirical analysis 
Table 1 presents the results from the local constant no-parametric regression 
with average CPI value as dependent variable and the four cultural values as 
independent (the full model). The results indicate a goodness of fit of 80.6% 
(R2=0.8059) and the nonparametric significant test (Racine, 1997) reveals that the 
four explanatory variables are statistically significant at 10% level (p-value= 
0.097744). However, the individual influence of every explanatory variable needs to 
be assed; therefore four additional nonparametric regressions have been applied.  
Table 1:  The results of the nonparametric regressions 
Variable Name  Selected Bandiwth R-squared Significant test 
PDI 8.0323 0.6013 0.0751*** 
IDV 9.7042 0.5555 0.0150** 
MAS 9.5203 0.2356 0.0350** 
UAI 21.1777 0.0683 0.0726*** 
Full model   0.8059 0.0977*** 
*Significant at 1% level.    
**Significant at 5% level.    
***Significant at 10% level.       
                                                                                                                                      
Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe. 
3 Many studies (Gokcekus and Knörich, 2006; Gokcekus, 2008; Gundlach and Paldam, 2009) have 
used CPI as a proxy of corruption with a scale from 0 (perceived to be highly corrupt) to 10 (perceived 
to have low levels of corruption). For details see: 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb 
4 For an extensive analysis of Hofstede’s cultural indexes see Halkos and Tzeremes (2010). For details 
see: http://www.geert-hofstede.com/. 
5 Power distance: ‘‘the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations 
within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally’’ (p. 28). Individualism versus 
collectivism: ranges from ‘‘societies in which the ties between individuals are loose’’ to ‘‘societies in 
which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups’’ (p. 51). Masculinity 
versus femininity: ranges from ‘‘societies in which social gender roles are clearly distinct’’ to 
‘‘societies in which social gender roles overlap’’ (p. 82). Uncertainty avoidance: ‘‘the extent to which 
the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations’’ (p. 113). 
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Sub-figures 1a, 1c, 1e and 1g illustrate graphically the conditional densities 
(stochastic kernels) for the four cultural values. In addition the sub-figures 1b, 1d, 1f 
and 1h represent the local linear nonparametric regression plots with their 
bootstrapped point wise error bounds. For the case of PDI (sub figures 1a and 1b) the 
stochastic kernel reveals that the probability mass lies on high PDI values and lower 
CPI values. In addition we observe that the probability mass lies also at lower PDI 
and higher CPI values. Moreover the nonparametric regression line indicates a 
negative relation between the PDI and CPI with a goodness of fit of 60% with the PDI 
being statistically significant at 10% level (Table 1).  
According to Getz and Volkema (2001) in higher power distance cultures the 
acceptance of separations between socioeconomic classes leads to the likelihood that 
officials demand or accept bribes and leads to the phenomenon where businesses will 
offer or pay bribes. For the case of IDV (1c and 1d) the nonparametric regression 
reveals a positive relationship with a goodness of fit of 55% and the IDV variable 
being statistically significant at 5% level. The stochastic kernel reveals that 
probability mass lies at higher IDV and CPI values, but also at lower IDV and CPI 
values.  
Collectivism in a society is associated with lower standards (in contrast with 
the individualistic cultures) which in turn affect whether a public official would 
demand or accept bribe Getz and Volkema (2001). Collectivism cultures may contain 
networks of friends and family creating relationships which can facilitate abnormal or 
illegal transactions. Furthermore, in the case of MAS (1e and 1f) the results indicate a 
“U” shape relationship with a goodness of fit of 23% and the MAS variable being 
statistically significant at 10% level. The stochastic kernel reveals that probability 
 7 
mass lies in two distinct points; first at higher MAS and lower CPI values and 
secondly at lower MAS and high CPI values.  
According to Getz and Volkema (2001) in masculine cultures people may be 
comfortable pursuing their goals through bribes provided they view the probability of 
success to be high. Furthermore, the nonparametric analysis between UAI and CPI 
(1g and 1h) reveals a negative relationship with a goodness of fit of only 7% and the 
UAI variable being statistically significant at 10% level. The stochastic kernel reveals 
that the probability mass lies again in two distinct points; first at lower UAI and 
higher CPI values and then at higher UAI and lower CPI values. In societies with high 
uncertainty avoidance individuals perceive that is necessary to work through informal 
channels in order to achieve their personal objectives and thus to minimize 
uncertainty. Similarly the officials accept and demand those bribes and illegal 
channels. Since the corruption patterns are established breaking out of them would 
create further uncertainty (Getz and Volkema 2001). 
Finally, looking at the R2 values of the four variables (Table 1) it appears that 
only PDI and IDV values in a society have a dominant role determining countries’ 
corruption levels.    
Figure 1: Nonparametric conditional PDF figures and local constant estimators 
using the AICc bandwidth selection and a second order Gaussian kernel throughout. 
 
1a  1b  
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4. Conclusions 
 The nonparametric analysis reveals the fact that culture and corruption are 
interrelated. The highly corrupted countries have strong and distinct cultural 
characteristics. These are high power distance and lower individualistic values. Since 
cultural values are not inborn and can be taught (Hofstede 1980), the biggest task of 
governments and policy makers lies ahead and that is to shape countries’ national 
cultural values towards an ethos of transparency through social institutions changes. 
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